The Valuation of Cash Flow Forecasts: An Empirical Analysis by Steven N. Kaplan & Richard S. Ruback
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES





Working Paper No. 4724




Lori Kaufman, Betsy McNair, and Kelly Welch provided able research assistance. Eugene
Fama, Wayne Ferson, Wayne Mikkelson, Mark Mitchell, Kevin M. Murphy, Daniel Nelson,
Mitch Petersen, Jay Ritter, Theo Vermaelen, and seminar participants at the NBER Summer
Institute, illinois, North Carolina, Oregon, Vanderbilt, and Washington provided helpful
comments. This research is supported by the William Ladany Faculty Research Fund, the
Center For Research in Security Prices (Kaplan), and the Division of Research at Harvard
Business School (Ruback). This paper is part of NBER's research program in Corporate
Finance. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #4724
April 1994




This paper compares the market value of highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) to the
discounted value of their corresponding cash flow forecasts. These forecasts are provided by
management to investors and shareholders in 51 HLTs completed between 1983 and 1989. Our
estimates of discounted cash flows are within 10%, on average, of the market values of the
completed transactions. Our estimates perform at least as well as valuation methods using
comparable companies and transactions. We also invert our analysis and estimate the risk
premium implied by transaction values and forecast cash flows, and the relation of the implied
risk premium to firm-level betas, industry-level betas, firm size, and firm book-to-market ratios.
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and NBER1. Introduction
This paper compares the market value of management buyouts and leveraged
recapitalizations to the discounted value of their corresponding cash flow forecasts.
Most economists readily accept the concept of estimating market values by calculating
the discounted value of the relevant cash flows. However, there is little preexisting
empirical evidence that shows that discounted cash flows provide a reliable estimate of
market value. This study provides evidence of a strong relation between the market
value of the highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) in our sample and the discounted
value of their corresponding cash flow forecasts.
Our tests compare the transaction values in HLTs to estimates of the present
value of the relevant cash flows. We use a sample of management buyouts and
leveraged recapitalizations because these transactions typically release the cash flow
information and transaction value required for the analysis. We use the cash flow
forecasts to estimate the cash flows that will accrue to all capital providers, including
different classes of debt and equity. We estimate a terminal value when the cash flow
information ends. We value the capital cash flows using a discount rate based on the
CAPM. We use three CAPM-based approaches to estimate discount rates corresponding
to firm-level, industry-level, and market-level measures of risk.Each of these
approaches works well: the median estimates of discounted cash flows are within 10%
of the HLT transaction values.
We compare the performance of our discounted cash flow estimates to that of
estimates obtained from alternative valuation approaches that rely on companies in
similar industries and companies involved in similar transactions. Such alternative
valuation approaches —knownas comparable approaches —arecommonly used in
practice. The discounted cash flow (DCF) methods, individually, perform at least as
well a. the comparable methods. We also find, however, that using the DCF and
comparable methods together explains significantly more variation in transaction values
than either method alone.
Overall, our DCF valuations generally parallel the basic techniques taught in
most business schools. The fact that our resulting values are approximately equal to thetransaction values suggests that the basic approach to valuation is both useful and
reliable. We stress that our valuations rely on several ad hoc assumptions that readers
(both academics and practitioners) should be able to improve on in a specific valuation.
We would expect such improved assumptions to bring DCF valuations closer to
transaction values.
We also invert our analysis to calculate an implied discount rate or internal
cost of capital —thediscount rate that equates the discounted cash flow forecasts to the
transaction value. The median implied risk premium is 7.55%whichis comparable to
the historic arithmetic average risk premium. We also examine the relation of the
implied risk premiums to firm size, firm book-to-market ratios, and systematic risk
measures to determine if our results are consistent with Fama and French (1992) who
find that firm equity returns are unrelated to firm-level measures of systematic risk
when firm size and book-to-market ratios are taken into consideration. We fmd that the
implied risk premiums are not significantly related to firm size nor to the pre-transaction
book-to-market ratio. The implied risk premiums are positively related to firm and
industry betas. For this sample, therefore, we favor CAPM-based approaches to
discount rates over those based on size or book-to-market ratios.
The success of the discounted cash flow valuations is impressive because
HLTs pose additional complications beyond the general concerns about capital market
imperfections and intertemporal asset pricing models that arise in any valuation
problem. First, the cash flow forecasts we rely on come from published legal filings
and may not be constructed to be estimates of expected cash flows. Second, even if the
cash flow forecasts are intended to be expected cash flows, the forecasting process is
likely to involve substantial errors because major changes in organizational form and
asset deployment accompany the HLTs. Third, since these firms have extremely
leveraged capital structures, they may be limited in their access to capital markets and
in their ability to use interest tax shields. Finally, the securities of these firms —
particularlyhigh yield debt and private equity —arelikely to be substantially less liquid
than the liabilities of most large public corporations.Greater attention to these
2complications would presumably lead to better DCF valuations.
The success of the DCF valuation approaches in spite of the leveraged capital
structures and overall complexity of the HLTs raises concerns that there is something
special about our sample of HLTs. The primary concern is that the cash flows might
somehow be endogenous, and that endogeneity causes the DCF valuations to be
spurious estimates of transaction value. One potential source of endogeneity is that
deahnakers and managers in the HLTs may have had incentives to adjust the cash flow
forecasts. For example, incentives to bias the cash flow forecasts upward are present
when the true expected cash flows are below the level required to obtain transaction
fmancing. Incentive to bias the forecasts downward are present when the true expected
cash flows are substantially above those needed to obtain financing. Because the SEC
and courts effectively require the board of directors of the HLT company to obtain an
opinion from an investment bank that the transaction price is "fair," insiders and
dealmakers may have an incentive to reduce their reported cash flow forecasts to justify
the transaction price.
We conduct several tests to gauge the magnitude of such adjustments. We
examine the ex post accuracy of the cash flow forecasts and find little evidence of ex
ante bias. We divide our sample into subsamples based on leverage and outside
competition, and also find little difference across the subsamples. Finally, we use our
DCF valuation technique to value initial public offerings where the leverage and
incentives to adjust cash flow forecasts are different from those in our HLT sample.
We find that the DCF valuations provide reliable estimates of value for the sample of
initial public offerings. Overall, we find little evidence to suggest that the reliability of
our DCF approaches is restricted to HLTs.
The paper proceeds as follows.Section 2 explains our basic valuation
approach in more detail. Section 3 describes the data set along with some sample
statistics.Section 4 presents the valuation results and compares those results to
transaction values. Section 5calculatesimplied risk premiums and compares them to
firm betas, industiy betas, firm size, and firm book-to-market ratios. Section 6 discusses
3and addresses potential criticisms of our resultsbased on the incentives to adjust cash
flow forecasts. Section 7 summarizes theresults and presents our conclusions.
2. Valuation Techniques
2.1 Transaction Value
In our analyses, we compare estimates of value to thetransaction value. We
defme the transaction value as: (I) the market value of thefirm common stock; (2) pIus
the market value of firm preferred stock; plus (3) thevalue of the firm debt; plus (4)
transaction fees; less (5) firm cash balances and marketablesecurities. All of these are
measured at the closing of the transaction. We value debt not repaid as partof the
transaction at book value. Debt that is repaid is valued at the repaymentvalue. Our
measure of transaction value assumes that net working capital (excludingcash balances)
and long-term assets are used to generate the cash flows of thefirm.'
2.2 The Compressed Adjusted Present Value Technique
The Compressed Adjusted Present Value Technique (Compressed AP\') that
we use values firms by discounting capital cash flows atthe discount rate for an all-
equity firm.2 Capital cash flows equal the after-corporate-taxcash flows to both debt
and equity holders of the firm. Because the cash flows are measured after corporate tax,
the tax benefits of deductible interest payments are included in the cash flows.The
interest tax shields reduce income taxes, and, thereby, raise after-corporate-tax cash
flows. Our use of the Compressed APV method is equivalent to using the adjusted
The sum of the market value of debt, preferred, and equity represents a claim on
the value of a firm's future cash flows and the firm's current excess cash. We subtract
cash balances and marketable securities as our estimate of excess cash, because our
DCF estimates value future cash flows only. We obtain similar results when, instead,
we subtract excess cash used to finance the transaction.
2Wewould like to thank Stewart Myers for suggesting "Compressed APV" as a
label for this method.
4present value (APV) method and discounting interest tax shields at the discount rate for
an all-equity firm. This implicitly assumes that the interest tax shields have the same
systematic risk as the firm's underlying cash flows. An alternative way to interpret the
Compressed APV method is that of discounting the capital cash flows at the before-tax
discount rate that is appropriate for the riskiness of the cash flows.
The Compressed APV method simplifies the valuation of 1-ILTs. The widely
used after-tax weighted average cost of capital (WACC) approach is appreciably more
difficult to implement. The WACC approach requires that the cost of capital be
recomputed each period to include the effect of changing leverage over time. It also
requires additional assumptions about the firm's tax status to generate cash flows
assuming an all-equity capitalization.3 The Compressed APV also has a computational
advantage over the standard APV approach, because the standard APV approach
requires that the all-equity cash flows and the interest tax shields be discounted
separately at different discount rates.
2.2.1Measuring Capital Cash Flows
We measure capital cash flows in two ways, depending on the presentation of
the cash flow forecasts for the HLTs in our sample. The first method begins with net
income. We add adjustments for the differences between accounting information and
cash flows. These adjustments include depreciation, amortization, changes in deferred
taxes, changes in net working capital, and interest We add (before-tax) interest
payments, subtract capital expenditures, and add the after-tax proceeds from asset sales.
See Ruback (1989) for additional background on the Compressed APV technique









= Capital Cash Flows
Our second method for measuring capital cash flows begins with earning
before interest and taxes (EBIT). We deduct corporate taxes which we estimate as the
difference between EBIT and interest expense times the marginal tax rate. Information
on the marginal corporate tax rate is provided in 33 of the IILTs in our sample. For the
remaining 18, we calculate marginal corporate tax rates using the federal marginal tax
rates expected to be in effect at the time of the transaction and a state tax rate of 5%•4
Thiscalculation of taxes assumes that the HLT makes full use of interest tax shields.
We also make the adjustments for differences between accounting information and cash
flows, subtract capital expenditures and add alter-tax proceeds from asset sales:
(2) EB1T




-Changein net working capital
-Capitalexpenditures
+After-taxasset sales
= Capital Cash Flows
In our analysis, we prefer to use the first, net-income-based capital cash flow
measure over the EBfl'-based measure. The net-income-based measure utilizes
estimates of future tax payments made by the HLT firm while the EBIT-based measure
'Fortransactions completed before the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA), we
assume a federal tax rate of 46%. For transactions completed after the TRA, we assume
federal tax rates of 46% in 1986, 38% in 1987, and 34% thereafter.
6relies on our estimates of future tax payments. We use the EBIT-based method in the
15 HLTs in which information on projected taxes and net income is not available.
2.2.2 Terminal Values
We calculate terminal values as growing perpetuities by assuming that the
capital cash flow in the last year of the forecasts will grow at a constant nominal rate
in perpetuity. The growth rates should reflect both expected inflation growth and any
real growth implicit in the cash flows.
Only 11 of 51 sample transactions explicitly note an expected inflation rate.
The average expected inflation rate is 5%. Actual inflation (as measured by growth of
the GNP deflator) averaged 3.4% per year between 1983 and 1989. In 1988, the year
almost 50% of our transactions were priced, the GNP deflator increased by 3.3%. We
present our results using a nominal growth rate of 4%, which corresponds to a real
growth rate between 0% and 1%. Although we feel the 4% rate is economically most
appropriate, we also report the sensitivity of our results to different terminal cash flow
growth rates.
On average, depreciation and amortization exceed capital expenditures in the
capital cash flow used to calculate the terminal value. This is not a reasonable
assumption. With 4% nominal growth in perpetuity, we expect capital expenditures to
be slightly greater than depreciation and amortization. Accordingly, we adjust the
capital cash flow of the terminal value in two different ways to correct this
inconsistency: first, we set depreciation and amortization equal to capital expenditures;
and second, we set capital expenditures equal to depreciation and amortization. We
report the results using the first method, which we view as economically more
appropriate.5
We obtain qualitatively similar results both when we use the second method and
when we make no adjustment.
72.2.3 DLscount Rates
We discount the capital cash flows using the expected return implied by the
Capital Asset Pricing Model for the unlevered asset:
(3) r = rf+3"x[rm-rf]
where rr is the risk free rate, f3Uisthe firm's unlevered beta or systematic risk, and rm -
ris the risk premium required by investors to invest in a firm or project with the same
level of systematic risk as the stock market.
We use the unlevered cost of capital because it is a reasonable estimate of the
riskiness of the firm's assets. Our cash flow measure includes all of the cash flows
generated by the assets, including interest tax shields. Under the assumption that the
riskiness of these cash flows is the same as that of the firm's assets, the unlevered cost
of capital is the appropriate discount rate using the Capital Asset Pricing Model. The
unlevered cost of capital can also be interpreted as the before-corporate-tax, weighted
average cost of capital. The before-tax discount rate is appropriate to discount capital
cash flows because the tax benefits of interest are included in our cash flow measure.
By adjusting the cash flows for taxes and applying Modigliani and Miller (1963), we
can assume the weighted average cost of capital is the same for different levels of
leverage and we do not have to estimate the cost of debt.
We present valuations using three different measures of systematic risk. First,
we use a firm-based measure. We estimate equity 3's, 3c,usingdaily stock returns,
returns on the S&P 500, and a Dimson (1979) correction. Returns are used from 540
to 60 days before the transaction is announced. To obtain 13, we unlever 3C:
(4)( =[xE+39xP+xD]/[E+P+Dx(1-TaxRate)]
where B equals the market value of firm equity 60 days before the transactions is
announced, P equals the (book) liquidation value of non-convertible preferred stock, and
D equals net debt —thebook value of short-term and long-term debt, less cash and
marketable securities at the time of the transaction. We assume the systematic risk of
the preferred stock and the debt, 3" and 13d,withrespect to returns on the S&P 500 equal
0.25 —thebeta reported for high grade debt from 1977 to 1989 in Cornell and Green
8(1991).6 Finally,the tax rate equals the combined marginal federal and state tax rate
during the estimation period.
Second, we use an industry-based measure of systematic risk. We calculate
industiy equity betas using daily returns from a value-weighted portfolio of all New
York and American Stock Exchange companies in the same two-digit SIC code as the
sample companies. The industiy equity betas are calculated from 540 to 60 days before
the transaction is announced using returns on the S&P 500, and a Dimson (1979)
correction. We use (4) to unlever the industzy equity betas with the value-weighted
ratios of equity, preferred, and debt to total capital for firms in the relevant industry.
These industiy ratios are calculated using COMPUSTAT data for the fiscal year ending
before the HLT is announced.
Third, we use a market-based measure of systematic risk in which we assume
that the systematic risk for all sample firms equals the risk of the assets of the market
To obtain the market asset beta, we calculate the leverage of non-fmancial and non-
utility firms in the S&P 500 using the defmition from (4). The median leverage ratio
during the sample period, 1983-1989, was 0.20. Combining the market leverage in the
year before the transaction and a debt beta of 0.25, the median unlevered asset beta for
the market equals 0.93.
We calculate risk premiums as the arithmetic average return spread between
the S&P 500 and long-term Treasuiy bonds from 1926 until the year before the
transaction is announced. For our sample firms, the median risk premium is 7.42%.
In using this risk premium, we implicitly assume that the experience of the previous 60
years (or so) is the best predictor of the future. Some readers may view this assumption
as overly aggressive. Blanchard (1994), for example, argues that the risk premium
declined to 3% to 4% by the end of the 1980s. We follow the general practice in
finance texts in using the historical risk premium. [For example, see Brealey and Myers
6Giventhat the preferred stock is not convertible, we view this as a reasonable
assumption. In any case, this will have a small impact on the results because only 7 of
the sample companies have any such preferred outstanding.
9(1991)]. The reasonablenessof our choice is an empirical question that we implicitly
test in section 4 and explicitlyconsider in section 5. We also use the long-term
Treasury bond (approximatelY20 years to maturity) yield to measure therisk-free rate
in our cost of capital calculations. Long-termTreasury bond yields, by month, are
obtained from Ibbotson Associates (1991).
Our specifications implicitly assume along-term investment horizon.
However, we obtain qualitativelysimilar results when we base our analyses on ashort-
term investment horizon. For ashort-term horizon, we estimate the risk-free rate asthe
long-term Treasury bond yieldless the historic arithmetic average spreadbetween
Treasury bond and Treasury bill returns,and we use a risk premium equal to the long-
term arithmetic average return spreadbetween the S&P 500 and Treasury bills.
2.3 Valuation Methods Using Comparables
Practitioners often value companies using trading ortransaction multiples. In
these methods, a ratio of a performance measurelike EB1TDA to value is calculated for
a set of guideline or comparablefirms. Value is estimated by multiplying theratio from
the guideline companies by the performance measurefor the company being valued.
Valuation by comparables or multiples relies on twoassumptions. First, the
comparable companies have proportional futurecash flow expectations and risks as the
firm being valued. And second, the performance measure(like EB1TDA) is actually
proportional to value.If these assumptions are valid, the comparablemethod will
provide at least as accurate a measure ofvalue as any discounted cash flow approach
because it incorporates contemporaneous market expectationsof future cash flows and
discount rates in the multiple. In practice, however,the comparable companies are not
perfect matches in the sense that cash flowsand risks are not proportional. Also, there
is no obvious method to determine which measureof performance —EBITDA,cash
flow, net income, and so on —isthe appropriate basis of comparison. Consistentwith
these concerns, Kim and Ritter (1994) find that comparablemethods are not particularly
successful in pricing initial public offerings.
10The discounted cash flow method relies on forecast cash flows which directly
relate to the firm being valued and discount rates which are based on the historical
riskiness of the company (in the firm beta valuations) or industry (in the industry beta
valuations) being valued. The reliability of the discounted cash flowvaluation depends
on the accuracy of the cash flow projections,risk measures, and the assumptions used
in calculating the cost of capital, including the historical measure of the risk premium.
Both the discounted cash flow methods and the comparable firm methods therefore have
inherent estimation errors. The empirical issue is whether the firm-specific information
used in the discounted cash flow method offsets the lack of contemporaneous measures
of market expectations contained in the comparable methods.
To make the values estimated with multiples comparable to those estimated
using capital cash flows, we base our multiples on EBITDA.We use three different
measures of guideline or comparable companies. The first,which we label comparable
company, uses a multiple calculatedfrom the trading values of firms in the same
industry as the firm being valued. The second, which welabel comparable transaction,
uses a multiple from companies that were involvedin a similar transaction to the
company being valued. The third,which we label comparable industrytransaction,
uses a multiple from companies in the same industrythat were involved in a similar
transaction to the company being valued.
We construct comparable company value as the sample firm's EBITDAin the
year before the transaction multiplied bythe median industry multiple of total capital
value in the month of the transaction to EBITDA in the yearbefore the transaction.
Total capital value is the analog of transaction value, equallingthe sum of the market
value of common stock, the liquidation value of firm preferred stock,and the book
value of firm short- and long-term debt, less the cash balances andmarketable securities
of the firm. To get as close a match as possible, we calculatedthe industry multiples
using companies with the same four-digit SIC code andwith total capitalizations of at
least $40 million. If we found fewer than five comparable companies, werepeated the
calculation at the three-digit level, and, if necessary, at the two-digitlevel.
11We calculate comparable transaction value as the sample firm's EBITDA in
the year before the transaction times the median ratio of total transaction value to
EB1TDA (in the year before the transaction) for comparable HILTs. Comparable HLTs
are those HLTs among the 136 in Kaplan and Stein (1990 and 1993) that are priced
within one year of the date the sample transaction is priced.
Comparable industiy transaction values combine the comparable company and
comparable transaction approaches by estimating comparable transaction values for
HLTs in the same industiy. We use the sample firm's EBITDA in the year before the
transaction times the median multiple of total transaction value to EBITDA in the year
before the transaction for HLTs in the same 2-digit SIC code that are priced within two
years of the date the sample transaction is priced. We are unable to obtain an
acceptable comparable industry HILTformore than one-quarter of the HLTs (13 of 51),
and, therefore, the sample size for this measure is lower. Because the sample from
which we draw the comparables includes a large fraction of the HLT universe, we do
not believe this is a sample specific problem.
3. Data
Oursample of companies starts with two sources of highly leveraged
transactions. First, we use the sample of 124 management buyouts (MBOs) analyzed
by Kaplan and Stein (1993). These buyouts met four conditions: (1) the companies are
originally publicly owned; (2) the transaction is completed between 1980 and 1989; (3)
at least one member of the incumbent management team obtains an equity interest in
the new private firm; and (4) the total transaction value exceeds $100 million.
We add to this the sample of 12 leveraged recapitalizations examined by
Kaplan and Stein (1990). A leveraged recapitalization is similar to a MBO in many
respects except that it does not involve the repurchase of all of a company's stock.
While there is a dramatic increase in leverage, public stockholders retain some interest
in the company. These leveraged recapitalizations were completed between 1985 and
1989.
12We study these transactions because they are subject to Rule 13E-3 of the
Securities and Exchange Act. Rule 13E-3 applies to transactions in which insiders
potentially stand to benefit at the expense of outside, public shareholders. Item 8 of
Rule 13E-3 requires the HLT's board of directors to indicate whether that the
transaction is fair (or unfair) to public shareholders, and to provide a detailed discussion
of the basis for that opinion. Item 9 further requires the HLT board to furnish a
summary of any report or appraisal from an outside party that relates to the opinion in
Item 8. The disclosure in Item 9 usually includes some cash flow forecasts.
We examined the documents describing the transactions that these firms filed
with the SEC. These documents include proxy statements, Schedule l4D tender offer
filings, and Schedule 13E-3 filings. All but 12 of the 136 companies provide some
post-transaction financial projections or forecasts. Unfortunately, the forecasts do not
always include enough information to do a complete valuation.
We include in our sample those companies that provide at least four years of
post-transaction projections for (1) operating income before interest, depreciation,
amortization, and taxes; (2) depreciation and amortization; (3) capital expenditures; (4)
change in net working capital. These cash flows are the minimum required to calculate
the capital cash flows. In two additional cases, commercial bankers provided us with
projections distributed by buyout promoters at the time of the transaction that were not
available in SEC documents. We obtained the required information for 51 of the 136
1-ILTs. Twenty-two of these companies provide ten years of cash flow projections;
three, nine years; three, eight years; one, seven years; seven, six years; fourteen, five
years; and one, four years.
Table 1 shows the number of transactions with complete projections by year
of the transaction. This sample is time-clustered. Almost one-half of the transactions
were completed in 1988. All but six of the transactions were completed between 1986
and 1989. Table I also distinguishes between MBOs and recapitalizations: forty-three
transactions are MIBOs while eight are recapitalizations.
Finally, table 1 reports that in thirty-three transactions, the financial projections
13explicitly state that they reflect the buyout or recapitalization. The remaining eighteen
state that the projections do not reflect the transaction. Unfortunately, the meaning of
this statement is not always clear. Not reflecting the transaction may simply mean that
the projections do not reflect the proposed capital structure.Alternatively, the
projections may not reflect expected operating changes. The compressed APY estimates
for the 33 forecasts that reflect the transactions tend to have lower mean squared and
mean absolute errors than those for the 18 forecasts that are ambiguous. These
differences, however, are not statistically significant.
For each transaction with complete projections, we obtain information
describing the transactions from proxy, 13E-3, or 14D statements. Stock prices two
months before the transaction announcement and at transaction completion are obtained
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database and Standard & Poor's
Daily Stock Price Record .Otherfinancial data are obtained from the COMPUSTAT
Tapes. For more details on these transactions, see Kaplan and Stein (1990 and 1993).
In section 6, we address possible endogeneity issues by performing similar
analyses for cash flow forecasts of a smaller sample of eight initial public offerings
(IPOs) completed between October, 1991 and July, 1992. The IPO firms are firms that
had previously gone private in leveraged buyouts. These cash flow forecasts are not
available in SEC documents. Because the IPOs involved refinancing existing loans, the
IPO firms provided cash flow forecasts to commercial bankers who held the loans, and
we obtained the forecasts from those bankers.
4. Valuation Results.
4.1 Compressed APV Methods
Panel I of table 2 presents summary statistics for the valuation or estimation
errors of the three discounted cash flow and three comparable valuation methods. The
errors are computed as the log of the ratio of our estimated values to the transaction
value. Because we present the errors in percent, they can be interpreted as the
percentage differences between the estimated value and the transaction value. For
14example, focusing on the Compressed APV estimate using firm-specific betas, the
median error is 6.0% which means that DCF estimate is 6.0% greater than the
transaction value. Across the Compressed APV measures, the median errors are 3.2%
when industry-based estimates are used, and 1.0% when market-based estimates are
used. The mean errors are similar with the firm-based estimates overestimating
transaction values the most, industry-based estimates exhibiting less of an over-estimate,
and market-based estimates being closest to transaction value. The variation in the
valuation errors is greatest for the firm-based beta estimates, as well.
The errors across the Compressed APV methods are related to the estimated
asset betas. The median firm-based asset beta is 0.85, which is smaller than the median
industry-based asset beta of 0.88, which, in turn, is smaller than the median market-
based asset beta of 0.93. A higher beta increases the discount rate which in turn
decreases the estimated value. Across the methods of estimating beta we examine, the
higher the beta, the lower the estimated error.
The sensitivity of valuation errors to beta suggests that recommendations to
use lower risk premiums and higher terminal value growth rates would reduce the
accuracy of discounted cash flow estimates of value. Panels II and Ill of table 3 show
that this is the case by reporting the sensitivity of our valuation errors to changes,
respectively, in the risk premium and terminal value growth rates. For example, if we
use a risk premium of 6%, the median errors increase to 15.9% for the firm-based beta
estimates, to 14.1% for the industry-based estimates, and to 12.4% for the market-based
estimates. In contrast, when a higher risk premium is used, such as 9%, the median
errors of the firm-based, industry-based, and market-based errors decline, with errors of
-3.3%, -6.3%, and -9.2% respectively.
We also experimented with beta estimation techniques that adjust for the
tendency of betas to regress to the mean in future periods.7 These adjustments included
using (1) equity betas equal to an equal weighted average of the firm or industry beta
'SeeBlume (1975) and Klemkosky and Martin (1975).
15and the market beta, i.e., estimates that push the firm or industry equity betas closer to
one; (2) the Bayesian approach in Vasicek (1973)which estimates equity betas as a
weighted average of firm equity betas and the sample mean using thehistorical
distribution of the sample beta coefficients; and (3) the Bayesian approach in Stevens
(1993) which estimates equity betas using information in firm equity betas and industry
betas. These methods are basically weighted averages of the methods we present in
Table 2, and the results using these different techniques are roughly combinations of
those reported in Table 2.
4.2 Comparable Methods
Panel I of Table 2 also reports the valuation errors when value is estimated
using the three comparable methods. The estimates based on the comparable company
method substantially underestimate transaction value, with a median estimation error of
-18.1%. This is well outside the range of median errors for the Compressed APV
methods.
The comparable transaction based estimates are more accurate, with a median
error of 5.9%, which is in the range of median errors for the Compressed APV
estimates. In fact, the mean valuation error of 0.3% for the comparable transactions is
lower than the mean valuation error for the Compressed APV estimates. The most
accurate estimates are those for the comparable industry transaction method with median
and mean valuation errors below 1%. This method has the highest standard deviation,
however, suggesting that the accuracy varies across firms in the sample. Furthermore,
the results highlight the fact that the method is not generally applicable because it is
difficult to match both the industry and the transaction. As noted above, we were
unable to find matches for 13 of the 51 firms in our sample during a period in which
there were a relatively large number of HLTs. In other samples and time periods, we
suspect this problem would be even worse. This method also is difficult to generalize
to other common valuation problems, such as capital investment decisions, because
there is typically no transaction to match.
16We also examined (but do not report in the tables) a hybrid approach in which
we use the capital cash flows in the forecast period and the comparable company
EBITDA multiple to estimate the terminal value —multiplyingit by the EBITDA
forecast in the fmal year of the projections. We then discount the capital cash flows
and terminal value at the discount rate for one of the three APV approaches. This
approach yields estimated values that are significantly higher than the transaction values.
For example, using a market-based discount rate, we find that the median estimated
value exceeds the transaction value by 18.1%.One explanation for the poor
performance of this hybrid is that the EBITDA multiple at the time of the transaction
includes a weighted average of higher growth during the forecast period and lower
growth after the forecast period. By using the cash flows forecast over the forecast
period and then applying the EBITDA multiple at the end of the period, the hybrid
approach effectively double counts the higher growth during the forecast period.
4.3 Comparative Performance of Valuation Methods
The previous results suggest that both the Compressed APV and the
comparable valuation methods are useful in estimating transaction values. In this
section, we compare the Compressed APV and comparable valuation methods in greater
detail, using four measures of performance. The first three measures take an ex ante
perspective and assume that the transaction value is the "true" value. These measure
are also symmetric because they assume that under- and over-valuations are equally
costly. Because they are based on market prices, we view these three cx ante measures
as the most appropriate for judging the performance of the valuation methods.
Nevertheless, we also present a fourth performance measure that makes use of cx post
outcomes and, therefore, does not assume that the transaction value is the "true" value.
4.3.1Percentage of Transactions Within 15 Percent
Panel II.! of table 2 reports the percentage of transactions in which the
absolute value of the valuation error is less than or equal to 15%. Although it is
17somewhat arbitrary, we interpret a 15% error as a "small" error —smallerthan the
typical premiums of 40% or greater associatedwith these transactions, and smaller than
the factor of two used in Black (1986) to define efficiency. (Ourresults are similar
when we use windows of 10% or 20%.)
The estimates using the finn-based Compressed APV method are within 15%
of transaction value for almost one-half of the sample. The industry-basedand the
market-based estimates do better, with more than 60% of the estimates within15% of
transaction value.
The comparable company method and comparable transaction estimates are
less successful than the Compressed APV methods. Only 37% of the comparable
company values and 47% of the comparabletransaction estimates are within 15%. The
percentages for the industry-based and market-basedAPV methods are significantly
greater (at the 10% level or better) than those forthe comparable company method.
The percentage for the industry-based APV method is also significantly greater than that
for the comparable transaction method.
In the 38 transactions for which we can apply the comparable approach that
matches both industry and transaction, 58% of the valuation errors are less than 15%.
This comparable method therefore has about the same percentage of errors within 15%
as the Compressed APV methods.
4.3.2Mean Absolute Error
The second performance measure is the mean absolute error of the valuation
errors (MAE). This assumes that under- and over-valuations are equally costlyand that
the cost of valuation errors increases linearly. The MAE is 20% for the Compressed
APV using the firm-based betas, and less than 17% for the estimates using industry- and
market-based betas. The comparable methods have generally higher MAEs; 24.7% for
company-based comparables, 18.1% for transaction-based comparables, and 20.5% for
industry- and transaction-based comparables. The MAEs of the industry- and market-
based APV methods are significantly smaller than the MAE of the comparable company
18method.
4.3.3Mean Squared Error
Our third measure is the mean squared error of the valuation errors (MSE).
This assumes that under- and over-valuations are equally costly and that the cost
increases are quadratic.Using this measure, the comparable company and the
comparable industiy transaction methods perform poorly —withhigher mean squared
errors than any APV method. The comparable transaction method, in contrast, does
best, performing slightly (but insignificantly) better than the industiy-based method
(MSE of 5.5%) and the market-based method (MSE of 5.0%). The comparable
company method MSE is significantly greater than the market-based method MSE and
the comparable transaction MSE.
4.3.4Summary of Ex Ante Measures
We conclude, based on the results presented in Table 2, that the Compressed
APV techniques provide a reasonable and accurate measure of value. The median and
mean estimation errors are below 6.3% for all Compressed APV methods. And the
valuation errors have a strong tendency towards zero, with about 50% or more of the
estimated values being within 15% of the transaction value. If we had to choose among
the three Compressed APV methods, we would pick the industry-based or market-based
beta approaches. The Compressed APV method using these two approaches have a
roughly equal ability to predict transaction values.
Among the comparable methods, the comparable firm method performs poorly
in every dimension.It is the least reliable valuation method we examine. The
comparable transaction along with the comparable method matching industry and
transaction work better than the comparable firm method, and, work almost as well as
the Compressed APV methods.
We favor the Compressed APV methods for three reasons.First, the
Compressed APV methods have more valuation errors within 15%, and lower MAEs
19and MSEs. Second, we think that in practice participants are likelyto have access to
better estimates of cash flows and other inputsinto the Compressed APV method than
we have had available to. us. Onthe other hand, we think that our information on
comparables —especiallyon comparable transactions —isclose to the information that
would have been used in practice.Thus, we think practical application of the
Compressed APV method will improve its accuracy. Third,the comparable methods
that work best are based on transactions, and therefore havelittle applicability beyond
a transaction context. In contrast, the CompressedAPV method can be used in a
variety of corporate finance applications. Thiscriticism is relevant even in the current
sample for the comparable industry transactionmethod because that method fails to
produce estimated values for more than one-quarterof the sample HLTs.
4.3.5Performance Based on Outcomes
Our fmal measure of performance makes use of ex post evidence on whether
the sample companies have defaulted on their debt after the transaction.As of
December 1993, 17 of the 51 sample companies had defaulted. This is a noisy
measure of transaction success from the viewpoint of lendersand equity investors.
Some transactions that have not defaulted may default in the future or yield low returns
to their investors. This measure is also noisy in that it is almost sure toreflect events
that were not expected at the time of the HLTs.
Our performance measure is the percentage of mistakes made by the various
methods based on ex post outcomes. The estimated values can be mistaken in two
ways. First, if the estimated value exceeds the transactionvalue and the HLT
subsequently defaults on its debt payments, the estimated value accepted a baddeal.
Second, if the estimated value is less than the transaction value and the HLT does not
default on its debt payments, the estimated value rejected a good deal. Our cx post
measure of mistakes places no weight on how far the estimated value is fromthe
transaction value.
In panel II of table 2, the firm-based Compressed APV method and the
20comparable industiy transaction method make the smallest percentage of errors, ex post;
the market-based Compressed APV method makes the most. Even the best of these
methods is mistaken more than 40% of the time. Overall, the Compressed APV
methods and comparable methods perform about equally well (or badly). The only
significant difference is that between the percentage of errors of the market-based
Compressed APV method and the comparable industry transaction method. Again,
however, the performance of the comparable industry transaction method is overstated
because the method fails to produce estimated values for more than one-quarter of the
sample HLTs.
4.4 Cross-sectional Relation of Estimated Values to Transaction Values
The results in the previous sections focus on how well the Compressed APV
and comparable valuation approaches estimate the actual transaction value level. It is
possible, however, that one of the approaches could successfully estimate the transaction
value on average, yet perform poorly in explaining the variation in transaction values.
The converse is also possible. In this section, we consider these possibilities by
estimating regressions to determine how well the different valuation methods explain
the variation in transaction values. With a regression approach, we can also test
whether using the DCF and comparable approaches together can explain additional
variation.
The regressions relate transaction values to estimated values from the
Compressed APV and comparable methods. The basic model we want to estimate is:
(5) Transaction Value =a+3Estimated Value +c
If the estimated values are unbiased predictors of transaction value, the coefficient
estimates for the intercept will be zero and for the slope, will be one. The key question
with this model is the specification. It seems likely that the intercept term and the error
term will be related to value or size. Accordingly, we present two specifications. First,
we regress the log of transaction value on the log of estimated value. This assumes that
the residuals from the model are proportional to value. Second, we eliminate size
21entirely by regressing the transaction value as a multipleof EBITDA on estimated
value, again expressed as a multiple of EBITDA.
Column 1 of Table 4 presents the regression results for the log-log
specification. The estimates from the three CompressedAPVapproachesin column 1
are consistent with the approach providingunbiased estimates of transaction values.
The intercepts are all insignificantly different from zero, andthe slopes are all
insignificantly different from one. Furthermore, the estimatedvalues explain virtually
all the variation in transaction values and the residuals from the log-log specification
are well-behaved —thereis no evidence of heteroscedasticity or undue influence from
large observations. Again, the Compressed APVmethods perform at least as well as
the comparable methods. The comparable value methods explain a similar amountof
variation in transaction value, but the intercepts are larger. In fact, the intercept in the
comparable company regression is significantly larger than 0, indicatingit is a biased
estimator of transaction value.
It is possible that the different valuation approaches contain different
information about transaction values. Accordingly, column 2 presents estimates of a
regression that includes as independent variables the market-based CompressedAPV
values, the comparable company values, and comparable transaction values. All three
variables are statistically significant, the intercept term is not significantly different from
0, and the variables together explain a bit more variation in transaction value than any
one of them does alone.
In some sense, however, the DCF and comparable approaches arc too
successful in explaining the variation in transaction values using the log-log
specification. Although the residuals in the regressions are well-behaved, the log-log
specifications may perform so well because they regress measures of size on size. For
the second set of regressions, we eliminate size by scaling transaction values and
We do not present regressions using the comparable industry transaction estimated
values because the regressions include only 38 observations and because those values
explain less variation in transaction value than the other two comparable methods.
22estimated values by EBITDA in the year before the transaction. We then regress the
resultant transaction value multiples on the estimated value multiples:
(6) Transaction Value Multiple =a+
13Estimated Value Multiple +c
This specification is particularly interesting because it was customary to price HLTs as
multiples of EBITDA. [See Kaplan (1989b) and DeAngelo (1990)].
Table 4 presents results of both log-log and level-level specifications for these
regressions. Again, we prefer the log-log specification because it assumes a more
reasonable multiplicative error structure. In column 3, the estimates from the three APV
approaches explain from 35%to46% of the variation in the transaction multiples. The
industiy-based approach explains the most variation; the firm-based approach, the least.
In contrast, the comparable company and comparable transaction multiples explain much
less of that variation, respectively, 22% and 9%. Although not reported the comparable
industry transaction multiples explain only 5%ofthe variation.
While they explain an impressive amount of variation in transaction multiples,
there is one respect in which the Compressed APV multiples may seem disappointing.
The constant terms in the regressions differ significantly from zero and the slope
coefficients differ significantly from one. The likely explanation is that the constant
term measures the contribution of EBITDA in explaining transaction value.This can
be seen by multiplying (6) by EBITDA to recast the regression in levels:
(6') Transaction Value =aEBITDA +13 EstimatedValue +8'
If,as is likely, the estimated values are measured with some error,and EBITDA is
correlated with the estimated values, a in (6) will not equal zero, and 13willnote equal
one. (We also estimated the reverse regressions in which thetransaction value is the
independent value and the estimated values are the dependent variables.In those
regressions, only one slope coefficient in the APV estimate reverse regressions,that
using the market-based APV values, differs significantly from one, atthe 10% level,
whereas the slope coefficients in all of the comparable estimate reverse regressions do.)
In column 4 (and column 6) of table 4 we present the results of a regression
that, again, includes the market-based APV multiples, the comparable company
multiples, and the comparable transaction multiples. The APVand comparable
23multiples together explain almost 50% of the variation in transaction multiples. The
coefficients indicate that the APVandcomparable company methods both have
significant explanatoxy power for transaction multiples. Although the comparable
transaction multiple has the largest coefficient, that coefficient is not significant Again,
these regression results suggest that it is worthwhile to combine the information in the
APV and comparable approaches.
Overall, the univariate regression results indicate that the APV approaches
perform well relative to the comparable approaches in explaining variation in transaction
values and multiples. The APV approaches are individually superior to the comparable
approaches in explaining the variation in transaction multiples. We interpret these
results as additional evidence in favor of the usefulness of the discounted value
approaches. Choosing among the three APV methods, we prefer the industiy-based and
market-based approaches. These approaches perform well in estimating both the level
of the transaction value and in explaining variation in transaction value.
5. Implied Cost of Capital
In this section, we revisit the risk premium which is used in our Compressed
APV calculations. We devote special attention to the risk premium because there is
substantial debate about how the risk premium should be measured. Some rely on the
method we prefer which is a long-term arithmetic average of the historical spread
between a market index and riskiess bonds. Others prefer (incorrectly, in our opinion)
a geometric average over a long or short time period. These methods provide
substantially different measures of risk premiums. For example, the geometric average
spread is 5.4 1% which is roughly 2% below the median arithmetic average spread we
use of 7.42%.
We invert are analysis to derive the discount rates implied by the transaction
values to provide direct empirical evidence about the risk premium. We use the same
forecast capital cash flows and terminal values to calculate an implied discount rate or
cost of capital which equates the estimated value to the transaction value. The implied
24risk premium equals the difference between the implied discount rateand the yield on
long-term Treasury bonds at the time of the projections.The implied risk premium
represents the product of the implied market equityrisk premium and an asset beta. We
estimate an implied market equity risk premium by dividing the impliedrisk premium
by our market-based asset beta (where themarket-based asset beta is calculated using
the value weighted capital structure for non-financial, non-utilityfirms in the S&P 500
in the fiscal year before the HLT announcement).
5.1 Implied Discount Rates, Risk Premiums, and Market Equity Risk
Premiums
Using our assumption of 4% growth in calculating terminal values,table 5
reports that the median implied discount ratefor the 51 1-ILTs is I 5.77%, the mean is
16.28%, and the standard deviation is 2.69%. The implied risk premium,calculated by
subtracting the contemporaneous long-term Treasury bond yieldhas a median of 7.07%,
a mean of 7.14%, and a standard deviation of2.76%. The median implied market
equity risk premium is 7.55%, the mean is 7.74%, andthe standard deviation is 2.95%.
We do not find any variation over time in the implied market equityrisk premiums.
Admittedly, such variation might be hard to detect giventhe clustering of our sample
in the late 1980s.
Table 5 also presents implied discount rates, risk premiums, and market equity
risk premiums assuming terminal value growth rates of 6%, 2%,and 0%. Not
surprisingly, the risk premiums vary with the terminalvalue growth rate. The implied
market equity risk premium drops to 5.00% with no terminal value growthand increases
to 8.81% with 6% terminal value growth. As we noted earlier, wefeel that a 4%
growth rate is the economically most plausible assumption.
Like the evidence in section 4, the risk premium results strongly suggestthat
the Compressed APV technique works best when an arithmetic averagerisk premium
is used. The estimated market equity risk premium is remarkablyclose to the 7.42%
median risk premium (calculated using the long-term arithmetic averageof the spread
25between the S&P 500 index and long-term Treasury bonds) we use for our Compressed
APVestimates.There is no evidence that the use of lower risk premiums, however
obtained, would improve the accuracy of discounted cash flow techniques.
5.2 Relation of Implied Risk Premiums to Systematic Rislç Size, and
Book-to-Market
In this section, we examine the relation between our implied risk premiums
and (1) firm asset betas; (2) industry asset betas; (3) transaction size; and (4) company
book-to-market ratios (in the fiscal year ending before the transaction is announced).
Our examination is motivated by two findings. First, Fama and French (1992) report
that equity returns are negatively related to firm size, positively related to the book-to-
market ratio and, controlling for firm size and book-to-market ratio, unrelated to equity
betas. Second, our results, reported in section 4, indicate that the Compressed APV
method using market-based betas works about as well as industry-based betas. Both of
these results are contrary to the generally accepted notion that expected returns are
related to systematic risk. By examining the determinants of the individual implied risk
premiums in our sample, we provide evidence on how the market determines expected
returns. We use pre-transaction book-to-market ratios because book-to-market ratios at
the time the transaction is completed equal one for all management buyouts and are
typically negative for leveraged recapitalizations.9
Table 6 presents univariate regressions of the risk measures on the implied risk
premium. The regressions indicate that the implied risk premium is positively related
to both beta measures. In the two univariate regressions, neither of the coefficients on
the betas is statistically significant at the 10% level (using a two-tailed test). The
insignificance of the regression coefficient for the industry beta appears to be caused by
outliers. Non-parametric rank tests indicate that the risk premium is significantly related
In our regressions, we exclude observations with negative pre-transaction book-to-
market ratios.
26to industry betas (at the 5% level).
While the risk premiums are marginally related to the betas, table 6 indicates
that the implied risk premiums are not related to firm size —(thelog of) transaction
value —orto the pre-buyout book-to-market ratio. Non-parametric rank correlations
also fail to identif' any significant relation between the risk premium and either size or
the book-to-market ratio.
The patterns are qualitatively similar when one of the betas, size, and book-to-
market ratios are included in the same regression. In fact, the firm asset beta becomes
significant at the 10% level in the multiple regression. Overall, theseresults suggest
a positive relationship between expected returns and systematic or beta risk,but provide
no basis for concluding that discounted cash flow valuations couldbe improved by
basing discount rates on firm size or market-to-book ratios.
6. Potential Endogeneity or Hardwiring of Cash Flow Forecasts.
The previous sections indicate that the Compressed APVvaluationapproaches
provide reasonably accurate estimates of transaction values. This is somewhat surprising
because HLTs provide significant valuation challenges because of their high levels of
debt. The success of the Compressed APV approaches in valuing these complex HLTs
raises the question of whether there is something special about our sample of HLTs that
makes the Compressed APV technique so effective, and whether there are reasons to
doubt that the APV methods will work as well in practice as they do in our tests.
The primary concern is that the cash flows might somehow be endogenous,
and that the endogeneity causes the Compressed APV valuations to be spurious
estimates of transaction value. One potential source of endogeneity is that dealmakers
and managers in the HLTs in our sample may have had incentives to adjust thecash
27flow forecasts)° If the transaction value and financial structure are determined by
competition in the market for corporate control, dealmakers may have an incentive to
construct their cash flow forecasts to justif' the price and to convince lenders and
investors to finance the transactions. The transaction value and financial structure imply
a sequence of required interest and principal payments, and the forecast cash flows have
to exceed those debt payments for the transaction to be feasible. Because the sample
transactions are largely debt fmanced (a median 88% of transaction value), cash flows
that are constructed to exceed debt payments would be "hardwired" in the sense that
cash flows are constructed so that their present value will yield the transaction value.
One implication of hardwiring is that the cash flow forecasts are adjusted
upward or downward to approximate the required debt payments. Incentives to bias the
cash flow forecasts upward may occur when true expected cash flows are below the
level required to obtain financing. Incentives to bias the cash flows downward may
occur when the true expected cash flows are substantially in excess of those required
to obtain financing. Because the SEC and courts require the FILT firm's board of
directors to obtain an opinion from an investment bank that the transaction value is
"fair," insiders and dealmakers may have an incentive to reduce their reported cash flow
forecasts to justify the transaction value.
As an illustration of hardwiring, consider a typical HLT that fmances 55% of
transaction value with bank debt at a nominal rate that exceeds the Treasury bond rate
by 1.5%; approximately 35%oftransaction value with subordinated debt at a nominal
rate that exceeds the Treasury bond rate by 4.5%; and approximately 10% of transaction
value with equity at an unknown rate of return over the Treasury bond. Assuming
'°Forexample, although it is not in our sample, there is some evidence that the
managers at Interco made such adjustments during the financing of their leveraged
recapitalization. See "Fiction in, Fiction out" by Laura Jereski, Forbes, December 9,
1991, page 292. See also Burrough and Helyar (1990) for a description of how cash
flows were forecast in the RJR Nabisco buyout.
28equity yields a nominal return at least 4.5% overthe Treasury bond, hardwiring would
put a lower bound on the internal rate of return equalto the Treasury bond yield plus
2.85%.
The Treasury bond yield plus 2.85% is substantially below the implied
discount rate (the Treasury bond yield plus 7.07%) that we estimate in Section 5,
suggesting that our basic empirical findings are notconfounded by hardwiring.
Furthermore, hardwiring implies that all parties --investors,courts, investment banks,
etc. —usemethods like Compressed APV to determine the transaction value. Although
we doubt that the Compressed APV method works simplybecause everyone uses it, we
take the hardwiring criticism seriously and perform four additional tests forevidence
of hardwiring.
6.1 Ex post Accuracy of Cash Flow Forecasts
If the forecast cash flows are biased either upward or downward, there should
be differences between the forecasts and the realizations. This isdifficult to test
because we know of no method to directly measure the ex ante bias,if any, in the
forecasts. We rely, therefore, on ex post data to gauge the accuracy ofthe forecasts.
Using ex post data to assess the forecasts is, however, complicatedbecause the U.S.
economy entered a recession in 1990, lessthan two years after the majority of these
transactions. The forecasts were unlikely to anticipate the recession and thus, evenif
the forecasts were unbiased ex ante estimates of expected cash flows, we anticipatethat
the actual cash flows will exceed the forecasts. Nevertheless, we examinethe ex post
accuracy of the projections by comparingforecast EBITDA to post-transaction
EBITDA. We also examine EBITDA margins because the recession aswell as asset
sales not considered in the projections should have had less effect on margins.
We are able to obtain at least one year of post-transaction data for46 of the
51 sample HLTs. In the first and second complete fiscal years afterthe HLT, EB1TDA
levels are, respectively, a median of 3.7% and 14.4% below those forecast,both of
which are statistically significant at the 5% level. This is consistentwith optimistic
29cash flow forecasts caused by either ex ante optimism or an unanticipatedrecession.
In contrast, we find only weak evidence that forecastEBITDA margins are biased.
EBITDA margins are below those forecast by a median of 3.2%and 3.6% of the
forecast margin, respectively, in the first and second yearsafter the transaction. (If
EBITDA margins were forecast to equal 20.00% of sales, a 3.6%shortfall in margins
is equivalent to actual margins being 19.28% of sales.) Theshortfall in the first year
is statistically insignificant, while the second year shortfall is significant only atthe 10%
level. The EBITDA and EBITDA margin shortfalls are also smallerthan those
documented in Kaplan (1989a) for an earlier sample of management buyouts. Overall,
therefore, there is weak evidence of optimistic EBITDA forecasts.But the closeness
of the forecast and realized EBITDA margins suggests that the differencebetween
forecast and actual EBITDA is related to the unanticipated recessioninstead of an ex
ante bias.
6.2 Leverage
If cash flows forecasts are hardwired to repay debt, the hardwiring effect and
the accuracy of the Compressed APVapproachesshould be more pronounced in more
highly leveraged transactions. We test this implication of hardwiring by dividingthe
sample into firms that have above- and below-median post-transaction leverage (i.e.,
debt to transaction value). If hardwiring is causing our results, the CompressedAPV
techniques should be more accurate for the high debt sub-sample.
We do not find any significant difference in the performance of the
Compressed APV approaches for the two sub-samples. Using themarket-based APV
approach, the estimated values are within 15% of transactionvalue for 56% of the low
debt sub-sample and 65% of the high sub-sample. Also, the mean absolute errorof the
estimates in the lower debt sample is 17.1% of transaction value compared to16.3% for
the higher debt sample. Finally, the Compressed APV estimates (as multiplesof
EBITDA) for the lower debt sample explain more variation intransaction multiples than
the estimates for the higher debt sample —47%of the variation versus 29%.
306.3 Initial Public Offerings
Hardwiring implies that the APV approachesshould not work as well in
valuing companies that have little leverage.To explore the effectiveness of the
Compressed APV approach in valuing firmswith substantially less leverage than our
HLT sample, we used the technique to estimatethe value of finns in initial public
offerings. The IPOs are also interestingbecause dealmakers in IPOs face incentives
different from those in HLTs. In HLTs, cashflows may be upward biased to obtain
financing or downward biased to obtain afairness opinion. In the IPOs in our sample,
there is an incentive to raise forecasts to get financing or get ahigher price, but —
unlikeHLTs —thereis no incentive to lower forecasts. If hardwiring andassociated
incentives are causing spurious results in our HLT sample,the Compressed APV
techniques should be higher and less accuratefor the IPOs.
We obtained detailed cash flow forecasts for eightinitial public offerings
(IPOs) completed between October, 1991and July, 1992. The IPOs all involved
refmancing of existing debt because the eightissuers were companies that had
previously completed highly leveragedtransactions. We calculate the transaction value
using the closing stock price on the dayof the IPO. Based on this price, the median
post-IPO leverage ratio of 52.6% is appreciablylower than the 87.9% for the sample
HLTs.
Table 7 presents the results using the market-basedAPV approach with
terminal value growth rates of 4%, 6%, 2%, and0%. As with the FILl sample, we
focus on the results using the 4% terminal value growthrate. Because expected
inflation was arguably lower in 1991 and 1992 than inthe earlier liLT period, however,
we also discuss the results for the 2% growthrate.
Although the sample is small, the APV approachstill performs fairly well.
The median APV is 7.8% greater than firm value at a4% terminal value growth rate,
and 1 .9% less than firm value at a 2% terminal value growthrate. The APV estimates
are within 15% of firm value in 50.0%of the IPOs using 4% terminal value growth
31(and 37.5% of the IPOs using a 2% terminal value growth). Althoughthis is less often
than for the HLTs, such performance is as good as the comparable companyand
comparable industry performance for the HLTs. Finally,the APV estimates explain
37% of the variation in IPO value multiples, or approximately asmuch of the variation
in FELT transaction value multiples that the DCF estimates explained.
6.4 Contested and Uncontested HLTs
Incentives to raise a cash flow forecast to justify a transaction ought to be
higher when there are other bidders or some otherform of outside pressure. In such
situations, the failure to finance and complete the 1-ILT both increasesthe likelihood that
incumbent managers will lose their jobs (to the winning bidder) and ensuresthat
dealmakers will lose their transaction fees. This suggests that in transactionsthat
involve multiple bidders or hostile pressure, forecast cash flows ought to be higher
relative to true "expected" cash flows. If this is the case, ex post performancerelative
to the forecasts ought to be lower. One might also argue that the APVestimates ought
to be closer to the transaction values —i.e.,have smaller MAEs and MSEs —when
there is hostile pressure. We find little support for these two hypotheses.
In our sample, 18 firms explicitly received competing bids and additional 6
firms experienced hostile pressure in the form of block share purchases by outside
parties for a total of 24 firms with some form of outside pressure.There was no overt
outside pressure for 27 transactions. The valuation errors are insignificantly different
across the two sub-samples. Using a market-based APV approach (with4% terminal
value growth), the median APV estimate is 2.6% above the transaction value (mean is-
0.2%) when there is outside pressure and 1.6% below the transaction value (meanis
3.1%) when there is not. The Compressed APV estimates are more accurate,but
insignificantly so, when there is outside pressure. For example, the mean absolute error
for the outside pressure sample is 14.4% compared to 18.7% for the non-hostile sample.
Also, 67% of the outside pressure APV estimates are within 15% of transactionvalue
compared to 56% of the APV estimates with no outside pressure.
32When we compare the ex post performance of the two sub-samplesof 1-ILls
to the cash flow forecasts, we find no significantdifferences in EBITDA or EBITDA
margins. In the first and second post-transaction years,respectively, EBITDA levels are
a median of 9.5%and13.6% below those forecast for the outside pressure transactions
and 2.8% and 20.5% below those forecast for thetransactions with no outside pressure.
Similarly, EBITDA margins are a median of6.1% and 2.6% below those forecast for
the outside pressure transactions and 2.0 and4.6% below those forecast for the
transactions with no outside pressure.
6.5 Discussion
Thefour sets of tests we perform all fail to supportthe predictions of
hardwiring. In our view, there is no evidence to suggestthat the reliability of the
Compressed APV methods is spurious. However,without ex ante evidence that the
cash flow forecasts are actually an estimate of expectedcash flows, we cannot
completely eliminate the possibility thatdealmakers systematically and materially
adjusted their cash flow forecasts. There mayhave been other pressures or incentives
that we have not examined. We have, however, shownthat the most obvious (at least
to us) possible biases in the forecasts do notreceive strong support from our data.
Furthermore, there are several reasons that adjustmentsto cash flows,
especially larger ones, are costly. First, mostof the dealmakers and investors in a
particular HLT could expect to meet againin a future transaction.There were
undoubtedly some reputational incentives not to presentfictional forecasts. Second, in
transactions that ultimately fail, creditors can sue insidersunder fraudulent conveyance
law if the original transaction rendered the companyinsolvent (solvency test) or the
company had unreasonablysmall capital, i.e., insufficient forecast cash flow tomeet
debt payments (capital test). Both tests rely on thecash flow forecasts made at the time
of the transaction. Courts and their examiners infraudulent conveyance hearings have
33paid careful attention towhether the cash flow forecasts were "reasonable."1 The
failure of the Interco recapitalizatioflreceived such an unusual amount of attention
precisely because the cash flowforecasts were considered to have been unreasonable.
Finally, academic and anecdotal evidence suggestthat bankers and buyout
specialists took the cash flow forecasts velyseriously. Anders (1992) writes that the
projections "took on a stature that wasboth awesome and terrifying to top executives.
Unlike budgets that executives devised, thebank-book projections were ironclad."
(Denis and Denis (1993) provide quantitativeevidence that firms in recapitalizations
were constrained by such budgets.)At a minimum, managers could expect that failure
to meet .those projections would bringincreased scrutiny and pressure from banks and
investors. To the extent that missed projections arefollowed by missed debt payments,
equity investors could expect to lose theirinvestment and managers could expect to lose
their investment and their jobs.
7. Summary
This study provides evidence that discounted cash flowvaluation methods
provide reliable estimates of market value. Ourmedian estimates of discounted cash
flows for 51 HLTs are within 10% of the market valuesof the completed transactions
and perform at least as well as valuation approaches using companiesin similar
industries and companies involved in similar transactions. We stressthat our estimates
rely on a number of ad hoc assumptions that readers (bothacademics and practitioners)
should be able to improve on. We would expect such improvementsto bring the DCF
valuations even closer to the transaction values.
We use three CAPM-based approaches to estimatediscount rates
corresponding to firm-level, industry-level, and market-level measuresof risk. All three
methods perform well compared to those using comparable transactionsand companies.
See Luehrman and flirt (1991) and Baird (1991) for discussionsof fraudulent
conveyance law.
34Under what we consider the most realistic assumptions,the industzy- and market-based
approaches perform best.
Although the DCF approaches perform atleast as well as the comparable-
based approaches, we find that the comparable-basedestimates add explanatory power
to the DCF-based estimates. Accordingly, wewould recommend using information
from both types of approaches in practical valuation settingswhere comparable values
are available.
In the second part of this paper, we use the forecastcash flows and transaction
values to calculate implied discount rates andrisk premiums. The median implied
market equity risk premium, the amount bywhich the return on the equity market
exceeds the long-term Treasury bond yield, equals7.55%.Thisaccords well with the
historical risk premium by which returns on the S&P500 have exceeded Treasury bond
returns. The relations between the impliedrisk premiums and both firm and industry
betas are positive and marginally significant. In contrast,there are no apparent relations
between the implied risk premiums and eithertransaction value, i.e., firm size, or book-
to-market ratios. For this sample, therefore, the resultsfavor CAPM-based approaches
to discount rates over those based on size orbook-to-market ratios.
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37Table I
Highlyleveraged transactions with usable projections by yearof transaction, by type of transaction, and by
whether the projections reflect the transaction for 136 management buyoutsand highly leveraged transactions
completed between 1980 and 1989.







1983 1 0 1 0 0 0
1984 2 0 2 0 0 0
1985 3—
3 2 2 1 1
1986 8 8 4 4 4 4
1987 6_
3 5 2 1
1988 24 14 22 12 2 2
1989 7 5 7 5 0 0
Total 51 33 43 25 8 8Table 2
Comparisonofdifferent valuation methods
Comparison of CAPM-based and comparable-based valuation methods in 51 highly leveragedtransactions completed between 1983 and 1989. The
first four rows present the medians, means, standard deviations, and mscrquzrule ranges of the valuation errors.The valuation errors equal the natural
log of estimated values relative to transaction values. Valuation errors are reportedin percent Pcrxmancc measure I is the percentage of
transactions in which absolute value of the valuation errors is less than or equal to 15%. Performance measure2 is the mean absolute error of the
valuation errors (in percent). Performance measure 315 the mean squared error of valuation errors (in percent).Performance measures 4A and 40
equal the percentage of transactions in which (4A) the estimated value exceeds thetransaction value and the HLT subsequently defaults on its debt
payments (accept bad deals); and (4B) the estimated value is less than the transactionvalue and the HLT does not default on its debt payments (reject
good deals) CAPM-based values arc the estimated present values of projected capitalcash flows. Terminal values are grown at 4%. Discount
rates equal the long-term Treasury bond yield as the time of the projections plus the equityrisk premium times the relevant asset beta. The risk
premium is the arithmetic average premium of the S&P 500 return over the long-term Treasurybond return from 1926 until the year before the
transaction is announced. Estimated present values arc calculated using (A) CAPM-based approsdtwith firm asset betas; (B) CAPM-bascd approach
with industry asset betas from value-weighted industry pnsdobOs; (C) CAPM-based approach with market asset
betas. Comparable values are
caiculatcd wing (D) comparable company approach; (E) compatible transaction approach; and (F) comparable industrytransaction approach (for
which observations arc litnited to 38 transactions). The transaction value equals (I) the market value oldiefirm common stock; (2) plus the market
value of firm preferred stuck; plus (3) the value of the finn debt; pIus (4) transaction fees; less (5)firm cash balances and marketable secwiucs.
all at the time of the transaction. Debt not repaid in the transaction is valued at book value; debt thatis repaid, at the repayment value.



















Statistics for Valuation Errors:
6.0% 3.2% 1.0% -18.1% 5.9% -0.1%
6.3% 43% 1.5% -16.6% 03% -0.7%
Deviation 27.2% 23.3% 22.5% 25.4% 223% 28.7%
Range 32.7% 19.9% 26.4% 41.9% 32.2% 23.7%
(median) 0.85 0.88 0.93
Measuresfor Valuation Errors:
15% 49.0% 64.7% 60.8% 37.3% 47.1% 57.9%
Absolute Error 20.0% 16.5% 16.7% 24.7% 18.1% 20.5%
Squared Error 7.6% 5.5% 5.0% 9.1% 4.9% 8.0%
bad deals 21.6% 23.5% 25.5% 9.8% 21.6% 131%









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cross-sectiOnalrelation ofestimated vaJucs to transaction values
Regressions of
transaction values on estimated net present values in SI highly
leveraged transactions completed between 1983 and 1989. Regressions
using multiples include transaction values and
estimated net present values as multiples of EBIThA inthe year before the transaction. Estimated
net present values e calculated using (A) CAPM-b*Sed
approach with finn asset betas; (B) CAPM-based approach
with indusfly asset betas from
value-weighted industsy portfolios; (C) CAPM-baSCd approach
with market asset betas; (D) comparable company approach,and (E) comparable
transaction approach. All CAPM-btsedapproachesuse a tenninal value growth rate of 4%. Transaction
value equals (I) the market value of the
finn common stock; (2) plus the market value of finn preferred
stock; pIus (3) the value of the finn debt; plus (4) transactionfees; less (5) firm
cash balances and marketable securities. all as the timeof the transaction. Debtnotrepaid in the transaction is valued at book value;debtthat is
repaid, at the repayment value. Standard errors arein brackets.








Univariate Combined Univariate Combined Univariate Combined
Estimated values: Regressions Regression Regressions Regression Regression Regressions
(logs) — (logs) — ittipIcs) — !Plc5)
(multiples) (multiples)
A. Finn Beta
Constant 0.04 (0211 1.21' (0.18) 5.33' (0.81)
Slope 0.98 (0.03] 0.41' (0.081 0.34' (0.08)
R' —0.95 R'—0.35 R5026
B. Industry Beta
Constant 0.06 (0.18) 1.03' (0.17) 430' (0.741
Slope 0.99' [0.03] 0.50' (0.08] 0.46' 10.08]
R'0.97 R'—046 R'—0.42—
C. Market Beta
Constant 0.23 [0 17) 0.21 (0.131 1.06' [0.19)-0.14 (0.66) 3.77' (0.88) -1.42 (2.69)
Slope 0.97' (0.03] 0.35' (0.10] 0.50' (0.09] 036' [0.10] 0.55' (0.11) 0.35' [0.11)
P.' — 0.97 R' —039 P.' — 039—
D. Coinp. Company
Constant 0.55' [0 17J 128' (023) 4.51' (0.82)
Slope 0.94' [0.03] 028' (0.09] 0.43' (0.121 0.29' [0.11) 0.55' [0.11) 0.40' (0.11)
R'-096 R'-022 R'—034
E. Comp. Transaction
Constant 0.21(0.16] 039 (0.77] 1.40 (3.49)
Slope 0.97' (0.021 035' (0.11) 0.82' (036] 0.45 (0.31) 0.85' (0.42) 0.49 10.33)
R' * 0.97—
P.' — 0.98 P.' — 0.09 P.' —0.48—
P.' — 0.08 P.' — 0 54
N ohs SI SI SI 51 51 51
Significantly different from zero at the 1% level ';at the5'/. level', and at the 10/. levelTable 5
Implieddiscountrates, riskpremiums aM market equityrisk premiums
Discount rates, riskpremiums. andmarket equityrisk premiums impliedby projected capital cash flows in Si highly leveraged transactions
completed between 1983 and 1989. Annual capital
cash flows equal net income + depreciation + change in deferred taxes+ amortization + (cash
and non-cash) interest - capital expenditures - increase
in net working capital + after-tax proceeds of asset sales.When netpne is not available.
capital cash flows rises equal EDIT - estimated corporate
taxes + change in deferred taxes + ausotlizition + (cash and non-cash)interest - capital
expenditures - increase in net working capital +
after-tax proceeds of asset sales. Corporate taxes arc estimated as the taxrate times the difference
between EBIT and interest payments. Terminal growth
rate assumed to grow as 4%. 6%, 2%. and 05'.. The transactionvaluc equals (I) the market
value of the firm common stock; (2) pIus the market
value of firm preferred stock; plus (3) the value of the firm debt; plus (4) transactionfees, lest
(5) firm cash balances and marketable securities,
all at the time of the transaction. Debt not repaid in the trmnsactiois valued at book value, debt
that is repaid, at repayment value. The implied discount rate
discounts the capital casts flows to a value equal to the transactionvalue. The implied
riskpremium equals
the difference between the implied discount rate and the yield on
long-term Treasury bonds from (Ibbotson Associates) as the
time of the projections The implied market equityriskpremiumuses the value weighted capital structure for non-financial,non-utility firmsin
the S&P 500 in the fiscal year before the HLT announcement
to transform the implied risk pccmiwn into the risk premium for aninvestment with
a beta of!.
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0% 13.79
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B: Implied Risk Premium--- -
Mm. Max. N
























0% 5.22 2.99 2.76 .126 14.02 51
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